Finely balanced arguments present themselves, implicating a dialogue calling for serious efforts at understanding competing perspectives. No side hits a home run or makes a slam dunk, even if strong opinions often differ by reason of particular experiences or divergent weight accorded the risks and benefits of varying levels of arbitrator discretion. 1 Whether codes and guidelines promote the prospect of a fair fight in arbitration has been mooted most vigorously in the debate on standards for lawyer comportment contained in two sets of guidelines.
2 First came the International Bar Association Guidelines on Party Representation ('IBA Guidelines on Party Representation'). 3 Close on their heels were the Guidelines annexed to the Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration ('LCIA Annex'), approved by the LCIA Court in May 2014. 4 Each instrument implicates self-regulation of the legal profession, a matter discussed often in arbitration conferences and scholarly literature. In particular, the ASA expresses concern that the IBA Guidelines would place on arbitrators a duty that falls beyond their traditional mandate, and risk provoking further procedural complications that would distract from the main function of arbitral proceedings. . 7 As an alternative, the ASA suggests that concerns about procedural unfairness be addressed by 'improved understanding of [legal culture] differences' and 'if this were found to be necessary, in the context of the arbitration rules and their application….' Id. at 5. 8 Cyrus Benson proposes that critics of guidelines might fall into three camps: denialists, laissezfaire, and (iii) skeptics. The first camp denies the existence of any issue of counsel conduct in international arbitration. The laissez-faire group believes that attempts to create guidelines destroy the benefits that come with a free system of arbitration. Finally, the skeptics believe that regulating counsel conduct will cause abuse, costs and delays that overshadow any benefits. ARBITRATION 290-291 (2013) .
arbitrators, who often take on the role of a mediator and arbitrator in the same dispute. Absent codes of conduct, parties from diverse backgrounds receive little guidance on proper behavior.
Few would challenge the proposition that an arbitral tribunal has inherent power to preserve the integrity of the proceedings by taking appropriate measures against disruptive counsel. 13 If one lawyer repeatedly shouts rude epithets at his opposite number, the presiding arbitrator should normally ask the offender to sit down or to leave.
More problematic, however, will be those aspects of lawyering which receive varying treatment depending on the jurisdiction. In the United States, lawyers routinely prepare witnesses for testimony, while in many parts of Continental Europe such practice is considered inappropriate. 14 In jurisdictions following Anglo-American models, lawyers consider themselves under a duty not to suppress documents whose production has been ordered. In other countries, the duty of counsel to a client may override obligations to the arbitral tribunal, making it less than evident that such material will be delivered. In the conflict between the duty of candor to 13 For example, according to the Swiss Arbitration Association, 'under most if not all frequently used arbitration rules arbitrators have, expressly or implicitly, the powers to ensure the 'fundamental fairness and integrity' of the proceedings. If they do not always make adequate use of such powers, this would seem to be essentially a question of arbitration practice and arbitrator awareness rather than a lack of rules or guidelines'. 2014 ASA Board Report, cited supra, at para. arbitrators, and the duty of loyalty to clients, the latter often prevails in legal systems where attorneys do not see themselves as officers of the court.
Why and How Fairness Matters
As a preliminary matter, one might well ask why it matters that there be a 'fair fight' in arbitration. What should the adjudicatory system care that professional obligations (for example, disclosure of documents directed by the tribunal) should be respected by lawyers for one side, but not by the other. In a similar vein, one might ask why it matters that the arbitrator be relatively free from bias.
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Before the dispute arises, neither side knows who will get the benefits of an unfair dispute resolution process. Under this 'veil of ignorance', contracting parties will tend to prefer dispute resolution procedures that enhance the prospect of success to the more reasonable view of facts and law. 16 An uneven playing field hinders rather than furthers that objective, whether dice get loaded through biased arbitrators or counsel fighting with unequal weapons. Divergent rules, permitting some lawyers to engage in conduct forbidden to others, will mean that only one side has its hands tied by a professional restriction, thereby threatening the basic fairness of arbitral proceedings.
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15 Publicly, lawyers talk about the proverbial good arbitrator who will be honest and intelligent. Yet in evaluating candidates to sit in their own cases, they doubtlessly hope for someone welldisposed to their arguments. 16 In modern times, the phrase was popularized by the philosopher John Rawls with respect to contingencies to which a rule might apply. To be just, rules should be uninformed by existing litigation strategy. 
B. Merging Streams
Among arguments offered against codified professional guidelines, the most often presented relate to some version of the 'not needed' contention. For some, codes of conduct remain a response in search of a problem, with the downside of injecting undue rigidity. Good arbitrators, it is submitted, can manage cross-cultural conflicts with grace and flexibility, through established rules combined with informal understandings of how things should be done. Implicit in this vision of reality, arbitration takes its tone from a gentlemen's club of grand old men (with one or two distinguished women, perhaps) residing in a line drawn from London through Paris and on to Geneva.
If such days ever existed, they are long gone. Today, new players in the arbitral process include governments, companies, counsel and arbitrators from multiple litigation traditions.
International arbitration has been democratized through participation of talented lawyers and 19 In the so-called Trolley and Fat Man Problem a train will strike five people unless switched to a different path, where only one person will die. Disaster can also be averted by pushing a fat man onto the track, so his bulk will stop the train. When polled, more people agree to pull the switch than to push the fat man, although the arithmetic (one life for five) remains the same. Reluctance to push the fat man appears as a visceral reaction, contrasted to an impersonal flip of a lever. In a study at the Spanish University of Pompeu Fabra, willingness to push the fat man increased when the question was asked in a foreign language. See 'Language and morality: Gained in translation', ECONOMIST, 17 May 2014.
arbitrators from around the world. Enlightened policy-makers in the arbitral community will learn from the past by recognizing how arbitration has evolved over the past half century.
New entrants come to the arbitral process not only from different geographical regions and legal cultures, but also from varied professional paths: litigators from law firms; academics who teach contracts or civil procedure; transactional lawyers and in-house counsel; and a host of non-lawyers, including engineers, quantity surveyors, accountants, economists, insurance underwriters and government officials.
Increasingly, the world of international arbitration might be compared to a series of merging streams, trickling down from different places, ultimately coming together in a single river. Each of these varied backgrounds arrives in the arbitration community through a different path, with divergent training and perspective. Thus it should not be surprising that the very nature of arbitration, and obligations to be imposed on counsel, appear through different lenses.
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In this connection, the impact of diversity in background cannot be overemphasized. The simple invocation of 'fair treatment' will doubtless have effect in homogeneous communities that rely on reputation bonds and shame to encourage cooperative behavior. In theory, one national law might take on such power as to become internationalized in scope, much as Britain imposed its own norms throughout the world to end the slave trade in the early 19th century. 27 However, the chance of success for such a development seems slim in a world with so many legal cultures rightly concerned about their own notions of professional ethics, a matter to which we shall return later.
Tensions among regulatory schemes will of course arise even absent the IBA Guidelines or the LCIA Annex. In many jurisdictions, one lawyer who observes dishonest behavior by another must report the misconduct to professional authorities. 28 Sitting as arbitrator, attorneys might struggle between their obligations as members of the bar, to make a disciplinary report, and their duties to respect the parties' legitimate expectation that the proceedings will remain confidential. To address uneven playing fields, at least three possibilities present themselves. The first would be to address the matter in an ad hoc fashion, with each tribunal applying its own approach. The second implicates guidelines elaborated by a professional body with international stature. A final alternative would be to have the parties agree on standards in advance, most likely through a code of conduct annexed to selected arbitration rules.
A. Inherent Powers
One way to promote uniform standards for counsel conduct would be to leave the matter to the inherent power of each tribunal to maintain the basic integrity of the proceedings. On an ad hoc basis, arbitrators would decide what rules and sanctions to impose on disruptive lawyers whose behavior that threatens due process. If the parties fail to define the arbitrator's powers concerning counsel conduct, the tribunal may be left only with a default rule that by submitting protect the health of bakers was deemed an unreasonable interference with the individual's liberty to contract. The three paragraph dissent by Holmes accused the majority of judicial activism, suggesting that the constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory. answer in a cross-cultural context with such divergent views on the integrity of the proceedings?
B. Professional Guidelines
The second alternative would be along the lines of the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation, which purport to provide standards that take some of the guess-work out of the process. The IBA Guidelines on Party Representation join a growing number of nongovernmental instruments often referred to as 'soft law' to distinguish such norms from the ensemble of treaties, statutes and cases that make up more traditional sources of law.
To some extent, debate on the value and legitimacy of such 'soft law' has been unduly complicated by conflation of very different usages for this term. To some, the expression seems to imply derogation from the arbitrator's duty to apply relevant (and predicable) produce.' The legitimacy of this provision will not be self-evident to counsel from jurisdictions where loyalty to the client transcends duty to a tribunal as to information shared with the other side of a lawsuit.
C. Institutional Rules
A final option would be party agreement on standards of conduct, through reference to arbitration rules that include professional guidelines. Such an option would comport with arbitration's essential nature as a creature of contract, with professional guidelines merging with party autonomy to enhance the prospect that the litigants will get the benefit of their bargain: an This rule-based approach gives the application of professional guidelines a greater 'buyin' from the parties, and thus broader legitimacy. Unlike recourse to the inherent powers of a tribunal (ad hoc rulings), or guidelines elaborated by a professional association, the rules-based approach proves consistent with the contractual underpinnings of arbitration, where the two sides in essence define the equality of arms expected through adoption of an institutional code.
Critics of the rules-based approach assert that professional codes of conduct should be presented on an 'opt-in' or an 'opt-out' basis, rather than applicable in all events. Such suggestions have much merit, and will doubtless be explored by arbitration practitioners working with institutional representatives to enhance the optimum degree of acceptance. 40 And animosity between an arbitrator and counsel presents special challenges, given the variety of contexts in which hostility can arise. 41 These and other open issues in arbitration will form part of the rocks and potholes in the road to fairer proceedings.
III. Revisiting the Options

A. Specificity
For most legal norms, the devil lurks in the detail, with costs and benefits revealing themselves as rules and principles work themselves out in the rough and tumble of actual cases.
Standards of conduct for lawyers in international arbitration prove no exception. Even the most experienced arbitration specialist may find it a challenge to identify and articulate with confidence the 'right' rule. Although arbitrators might disqualify themselves based on long-standing personal friction with a lawyer for one side, it would be highly problematic to allow respondent's counsel to sabotage proceedings by provoking the arbitrator with curses and epithets designed to create the type of antagonistic atmosphere that could get the arbitrator disqualified.
uncontested) that discretion and flexibility remain key benefits of arbitration. 42 Overly general provisions may be manipulated depending on the objective sought to be achieved. Standards drawn too narrowly carry their own risks.
To enhance the prospect of a level playing field, the IBA Guidelines on Party
Representation invoke broadly worded standards to be applied in a wide range of scenarios. For example, Guideline 13 provides that parties' representatives should not make requests to produce or object to such requests 'for an improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay' but without defining either 'improper purpose' or 'unnecessary delay'.
The LCIA Annex states that it is intended to promote 'equal conduct of the parties' legal representatives appearing within the arbitration proceedings' but not to derogate from the arbitration agreement nor to undermine the lawyer's primary duty of loyalty to his or her client, or the obligation to present that party's case effectively. After its preamble, the Annex sets forth general prohibitions on activities intended unfairly to obstruct the arbitration or to jeopardize the finality of any award. There are also warnings against frivolous challenges to the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction and reliance on authority known to be unfounded.
Along a similar vein, the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation profess to be 'inspired by the principle that party representatives should act with integrity and honesty and should not engage in activities designed to produce unnecessary delay or expense'. This standard, however, will apply only to the extent that the Parties have so agreed, or the Arbitral Tribunal, after consultation with the Parties, wishes to rely upon the Guidelines after determining that it has the authority to rule on matters of Party representation.
Specific mandates may in some instances be controversial. For example, the LCIA Annex also prohibits knowingly concealing or assisting in the concealment of any document ordered to be produced by the arbitral tribunal. In some legal systems, that duty may be far from accepted, given a sense that the lawyer's obligation to the client overrides deference to the arbitral tribunal.
The Regardless of whether sanctions are leveled against counsel or the party itself, no selfevidently effective approach presents itself. Cost shifting may be inadequate if the misbehaving party has no assets. Adverse inferences remain theoretically possible, but pose a serious risk to award enforcement due to the possibility that they will appear to the recognition forum as a breach of due process.
Even without effective penalties, however, guidelines still promote equality of arms, to the extent of communicating useful information to lawyers from diverse backgrounds. Markers
tell both sides what is expected. Although not perfect, the current initiative toward guidelines for party representatives constitutes a first attempt to address the need for a relatively level playing field.
Disqualifying the Lawyer
Although some conduct resists effective remedy, other behavior will prove more amenable to useful solutions. Consider, for example, change of counsel during proceedings, a prospect that might result in unexpected conflicts (real or perceived) by reason of the late notice of a relationship between arbitrator and lawyer.
What is to be done if one side changes legal representation on the eve of the hearings, with the lawyer coming from the same firm (or chambers) as a member of the tribunal? Does the arbitrator resign? Or is the new lawyer excluded?
Those who object to disqualification of counsel by an arbitral tribunal usually emphasize the right to choose one's lawyer, which is true enough. Yet choice of counsel remains only one element of a fair proceeding. An even more fundamental expectation will be that the arbitrator be independent. No one with a dog in the fight should judge the contest. Such independence would be illusory if one side could appoint a lawyer from the same firm as the arbitrator.
At the beginning of the arbitration, selection of the arbitral tribunal will be restricted by concern to avoid conflicts with the named counsel. Neither side would normally be permitted to appoint as arbitrator a member of their legal team's firm.
The matter becomes more complex once the case has evolved. It would be highly disruptive if things had to stop, with a new tribunal constituted, because just prior to hearings one side appointed counsel drawn from the presiding arbitrator's family or firm.
There are, of course, ways to address the matter other than disqualification of the counsel.
A few minutes of silence, or a longer adjournment, may well provide participants an opportunity to evaluate the consequences of bias. Normally, however, postponement will be less appetizing to the claimant, which wants to get on with the case, than a respondent who welcomes a chance for delay. The LCIA 'approval' and IBA 'exclusion' would normally lead to the same result.
However, the LCIA formulation may have the merit of connoting respect for the parties' original position, and certainly sounds less aggressive than disqualification.
The change-of-counsel problem has been widely discussed in the context of an ICSID case implicating the Republic of Slovenia as respondent. 44 The tribunal had been chaired by an individual affiliated with the same barristers' chambers in London as a new co-counsel appointed by respondent late in the proceedings. 45 Although free to select its lawyers prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the respondent was found not entitled to change its legal team in a way that might imperil the tribunal's legitimacy, creating a justifiable apprehension of bias. The arbitral tribunal decided that the new counsel should not appear before another member of his chambers.
Discussions about exclusion of counsel often confuse two separate issues. In the present context, the first question will be whether some standards should address late arrival of counsel in circumstances that might sabotage the proceedings. A negative answer seems difficult. If the opening day of hearings finds Respondent appointing a representative from a law firm whose members include the presiding arbitrator, the case can hardly continue with serenity or integrity.
The arbitrator's resignation will put things back to square zero in a way quite unfair to claimant. 44 Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, dd v. Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24 (2008) . 45 The tribunal chair and counsel for respondent were both affiliated with Essex Court Chambers.
A separate question addresses whether a conflict does indeed exist, matter that remains fact intensive, with reasonable people often disagreeing. English barristers usually do not deem themselves tainted with conflicts of other members of their chambers, and thus see no objection to members of the same chambers acting as counsel and as arbitrator in a single case. Perhaps this will be the right answer from the perspective of those steeped in traditional London practice.
Yet it is not odd that those from other legal cultures may take different views in an age when chambers brand themselves for marketing purposes.
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C. Local Bar Authorities
Some commentators suggest that lawyer discipline by arbitral tribunals interferes with the role of local regulatory bodies such as bar authorities, 47 a view shared by at least some judicial decisions. 48 On reflection, the concern must be dismissed. experience does not always prove to be quick and cheerful, and on occasion suffers from the inherent unfairness of counsel taking cues from different legal traditions.
At the present moment, the arbitration community remains at the starting point in elaborating guidelines. Thus it should not be surprising that standards go too far for some, while not far enough for others. Any good faith attempt to create a better playing field implicates some trial and error, with compromise in demand during the search for an optimum of aggregate social and economic welfare.
A Latin adage holds that truth is the daughter of time: Veritas filia temporis. 53 In evaluating whether professional guidelines will make arbitration better or worse, the arbitration community must, at least for now, put the matter into a box labelled 'Awaiting Further Light.' 18.2 Until the Arbitral Tribunal's formation, the Registrar may request from any party: (i) written proof of the authority granted by that party to any legal representative designated in its Request or Response; and (ii) written confirmation of the names and addresses of all such party's legal representatives in the arbitration. After its formation, at any time, the Arbitral Tribunal may order any party to provide similar proof or confirmation in any form it considers appropriate.
18.3 Following the Arbitral Tribunal's formation, any intended change or addition by a party to its legal representatives shall be notified promptly in writing to all other parties, the Arbitral Tribunal and the Registrar; and any such intended change or addition shall only take effect in the arbitration subject to the approval of the Arbitral Tribunal.
18.4 The Arbitral Tribunal may withhold approval of any intended change or addition to a party's legal representatives where such change or addition could compromise the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal or the finality of any award (on the grounds of possible conflict or other like impediment). In deciding whether to grant or withhold such approval, the Arbitral Tribunal shall have regard to all circumstances, including: the general principle that a party may be represented by a legal representative chosen by that party, the stage which the arbitration has reached, the efficiency resulting from maintaining the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal (as constituted throughout the arbitration) and any likely wasted costs or loss of time resulting from such change or addition.
18.5 Each party shall ensure that all its legal representatives appearing by name before the Arbitral Tribunal (which term shall include, under Articles 18.5 and 18.6, any Emergency Arbitrator) have agreed to comply with the general guidelines contained in the Annex to the LCIA Rules, as a condition of such representation. In permitting any legal representative so to appear, a party shall thereby represent that the legal representative has agreed to such compliance.
18.6 In the event of a complaint by one party against another party's legal representative appearing by name before the Arbitral Tribunal (or of such complaint by the Arbitral Tribunal upon its own initiative), the Arbitral Tribunal may decide, after consulting the parties and granting that legal representative a reasonable opportunity to answer the complaint, whether or not the legal representative has violated the general guidelines. If such violation is found by the Arbitral Tribunal, the Arbitral Tribunal may order any or all of the following sanctions against the legal representative: (i) a written reprimand; (ii) a written caution as to future conduct in the arbitration; and (iii) any other measure necessary to fulfill within the arbitration the general duties required of the Arbitral Tribunal under Articles 14.4(i) and (ii).
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54 The relevant portion of Art. 14.4, which tracks s. 33 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act, requires arbitrators to act fairly and impartially as between all parties, giving each a reasonable opportunity of putting its case and dealing with that of its opponent, as well as a duty to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances, avoiding unnecessary delay and expense, so as to provide a fair, efficient and expeditious means for the final resolution of the parties' dispute.
